As one would expect, times were complicated. Here is a brief picture leading up to surrender:
On July 26, the United States, Britain, and China released the Potsdam Declaration, announcing the terms for Japan's surrender, with the warning, "We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay."
the elimination "for all time [of] the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest"
the occupation of "points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies"
"Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." As had been announced in the Cairo Declaration in 1943, Japan was to be stripped of her pre-war empire, including Korea and Taiwan, as well as all her recent conquests.
"The Japanese military forces, shall be completely disarmed"
"stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners"
But on the other hand,
"We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, ... The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established."
"Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, ... Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted."
"The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
The only mention of "unconditional surrender" came at the end:
"We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."
Whether the Emperor was of one those who had "misled the people of Japan", or even a war criminal?or potentially part of a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" was left unstated.
On July 27, the Japanese government considered how to respond to the Declaration. The four military members of the Big Six wanted to reject it, but Togo persuaded the cabinet not to do so until he could get a reaction from the Soviets. In a telegram, Kase Shunichi, Japan's ambassador to Switzerland, observed that unconditional surrender applied only to the military and not to the government or the people, and he pleaded that is should be understood that the careful language of Potsdam appeared "to have occasioned a great deal of thought" on the part of the signatory governments?"they seem to have taken pains to save face for us on various points." The next day, Japanese paper reported that the Declaration, the text of which had been broadcast and dropped on leaflets into Japan, had been rejected. In an attempt to manage public perception, Prime Minister Suzuki met with the press, and stated,
"The Joint Proclamation ... is nothing but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. As for the Government, it does not find any important value in it; the government will just mokusatsu it."
The meaning of the word "mokusatsu", literally "kill with silence", is not precise; it can range from 'ignore' to 'treat with contempt'?which actually described fairly accurately the range of effective reactions within the government. However, Suzuki's statement was taken as a rejection by the press, both in Japan and abroad, and no further statement was made in public or through diplomatic channels to alter this understanding.
On July 30, Ambassador Sato wrote that Stalin was probably talking to the Western Allies about his dealings with Japan.
"There is no alternative but immediate unconditional surrender if we are to prevent [Russia's] participation in the war. ...
Your way of looking at things and the actual condition in [the Soviet Union] may be seen as being completely contradictory."
On August 2, Togo wrote to Sato,
" ... However, it should not be difficult for you to realize that ... our time to proceed with arrangements of ending the war before the enemy lands on the Japanese mainland is limited, on the other hand it is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at once. "
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Hiroshima, Manchuria, and Nagasaki
The second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. On the morning of August 6, confused reports reached Tokyo that the city of Hiroshima in southwest Honshu had been the target of an air raid, which had leveled the city with a "blinding flash and violent blast". Later, U.S. President Harry S. Truman's broadcast was received, announcing the first use of an atomic bomb, and promising
"We are now prepared to obliterate rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have ...
It was to spare the Japanese from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on earth."
The Japanese knew enough about building an atomic bomb to know how very difficult it would be. (Typically, the Army and Navy had independent atomic-bomb programs.) At first, some refused to believe the Americans could have managed the feat. Admiral Toyoda Soemu, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, argued that even if the Americans had made one, they couldn't have many more. More detailed reports of the unprecedented scale of the destruction at Hiroshima were received, but two days passed before the government met to consider the changed situation.
At 04:00 on August 9, word reached Tokyo that the Soviet Union had broken the neutrality pact, declared war on Japan and launched an invasion of Manchuria. The senior leadership of the Japanese Army took the news in stride, grossly underestimating the scale of the attack. They did start preparations to impose martial law on the nation, with the support of Minister of War Anami, in order to stop anyone attempting to make peace.
The Supreme Council met at 10:30. Prime Minister Suzuki, who had just come from a meeting with the Emperor, said it was impossible to continue the war. Foreign Minister Togo said that they could accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, but they needed a guarantee of the Emperor's position. Navy Minister Yonai said that they had to propose something?they could no longer afford to wait for better circumstances. In the middle of the meeting, news arrived that Nagasaki, on the west coast of Kyushu, had been hit by a second atomic bomb. By the time the meeting ended, the Big Six had split 3?3. Suzuki, Togo, and Admiral Yonai favored Togo's one additional condition to Potsdam, while Generals Anami, Umezu, and Admiral Toyoda insisted on three further terms that modified Potsdam: that Japan handle her own disarmament, that Japan deal with any Japanese war criminals, and that there be no occupation of Japan.
