Just back from a wonderful vacation , Lake Superior North shore Lutsen, Grand Marais area....refreshing to be away from it all.
I envy people living amongst the bald eagles and loons and walleye....a simpler life.
NATO 2006 ? Global dilution / EU-US decoupling
NATO faced to a loss of confidence in US leadership
Excerpt of GlobalEurope Anticipation N?4 (April 15th 2006)
In Europe, the loss of confidence is significant and durable. Besides the general feeling that the US are losing influence (78% of the people surveyed in this month?s GlobalEurometre share this conviction), Iraq (now involved in a civil war) provides a daily illustration of the deadlock where the first global power has managed to stuck itself and its faithful allies. Besides the fact that the most active form of the initial opposition to Iraq?s invasion came from Europe (France, Germany, Belgium), it is clear that all European forces first involved next to Washington and London (Spain, The Netherlands, Poland, and soon Italy) have progressively pulled out. Given the pain experienced due to Iraq (on the field as much as in terms of domestic politics), it is highly improbable that European governments will support any future US military adventure, unless their countries are under direct threat. We shall come back on this aspect in the third part of the present paper, but threat perception is less and less convergent between the EU and the US.
This reaction by European leaders was predictable and reflects a radical and durable trend of the European public opinion during the Iraq crisis which led to the invasion of the country. It is from this crisis that a common public opinion emerged for the first time in the European Union [1] , that citizens from Budapest to Helsinki, from Lisbon to Stockholm, were touched by the same ? vib ?. At the time, this major positive trend in the EU took place in reaction against the Bush Administration. But his re-election, the deadlock in Iraq, Abou Graib, Guantanamo, CIA renditions, and other similar oppositions to the bottom-line of the action, have progressively transformed this opposition to one specific US administration into a distrust, see a rejection, towards the American leadership as a whole. A leadership is accepted when based on a feeling of material and moral superiority. These past years have seriously questioned both parts of the equation. The dominant trend at play within the European public opinion is to question vehemently the very relevance of the Alliance, and whether Europeans and Americans share the same values any longer. A clear sign of the crisis is to be found in the UK, NATO?s central pillar in Europe, where in the past months various military, judicial and religious high representatives expressed their conviction that values from both sides of the Atlantic were no longer the same. Such convictions are now dominant all over the continent. Even new EU-member states are affected by the trend and they too pullout from Iraq under the pressure of their public opinion.
In Turkey, the least ? typical ? member of the Alliance, the situation is more and more unclear since the US invaded Iraq (Turkish populations are now overwhelmingly hostile to the US [2] ) and since Turkey?s EU integration entered a deadlock due to EU populations? hostility to the project. In the years to come, domestic trends in Turkey will give ground to all the forces that consider that the country?s future is also (see ?mostly?) in the Muslim world, in particular in the Middle-East. This discovery will diminish NATO?s power of attraction (whose ? reward ?, EU entry as promised by Washington, appears less and less certain) and will strengthen distrust as regards to its objectives and ? added-values ?.
Transatlantic divergences on threat evaluation ? or the question of the Alliance?s ? added-value ?
This question of the Alliance?s ? added-value ? is at the core of all the discussions which will lead to the ?great debate? (or ?great washing?) of the Riga summit. A military alliance is worth anything if it can protect from the military threats anticipated by each of its members. In case the threat assessment by some of its members or by some groups among its members begins to diverge, the destiny of the military alliance is endangered. Once the assessment fully diverged, the alliance is dead even if it continues to exist formally in order to prevent obvious signs of rupture (which diplomats hate) to appear.
And it is a fact that both sides of the Atlantic no longer have converging threat evaluation. The Iran crisis provides the most obvious example of this situation: the Europeans, London included, reject any military intervention, while Washington strives to put back the option at the centre of the debate. But other examples are provided by the fact that for the Europeans, terrorism should not become an ?obsession? to the point of threatening civil liberties; or by the fact that Europeans feel more concerned by natural risks (global heating, pollution, epidemics?) and global social imbalances (poverty, hunger?) as sources of catastrophes, conflicts, terrorism and uncontrolable migrations, while the US remain focussed on classical or new (terrorism, rogue states?) military threats.
These ? expert quarrels ? hide two different visions of the world and convey different ways of preventing threats. From an EU perspective, these means are mostly to be built, see invented, and require the active participation of the other continents, from the other global players such as China, Russia, India, Brazil?. These means include military aspects of course too (and the Europeans are reorganising their armaments industry [3] in order to rationalize this aspect of their future security policy) , but only partly since the Europeans consider that threats are largely non-military and require judicial, commercial, political, scientific, humanitarian approaches? From a US perspective, military means are first and foremost envisaged to the detriment of other approaches (Katrina is a sad result of this policy), namely because the US own an immense war machine in need to justify its existence and related costs. In this case, the defence system programmes the threat. Even if some new EU- and NATO members continue to see Russia as a direct and concrete threat to EU security, the large majority of Europeans see Moscow as an unpredictable partner, to watch over and manage firmly, but by no means as a mortal danger. Europe has returned to its ?usual? historic situation from before the October Revolution.
Concerning the Arab and Muslim world, the Europeans do not share US fantasies that they will invade Europe and the world. Some extremists certainly do. But for most Europeans, the challenge is to prevent their madness to grow on to these countries? populations, and that requires to do exactly the opposite of what the US is currently doing in Iraq. A double divergence therefore: on the content and on the means? reflecting the current debates conducted within NATO.
In November 2006, the Europeans will most probably give way to Washington?s desire to enlarge NATO to non European countries and integrate members from the rest of the world into some sort of an ? Alliance of Democracies ?, but this geographic expansion will result in a dilution of the operational military aspect of the Alliance, in an acceleration of the common European defence and in the diversification of the Alliance?s armaments suppliers.
I envy people living amongst the bald eagles and loons and walleye....a simpler life.
NATO 2006 ? Global dilution / EU-US decoupling
NATO faced to a loss of confidence in US leadership
Excerpt of GlobalEurope Anticipation N?4 (April 15th 2006)
In Europe, the loss of confidence is significant and durable. Besides the general feeling that the US are losing influence (78% of the people surveyed in this month?s GlobalEurometre share this conviction), Iraq (now involved in a civil war) provides a daily illustration of the deadlock where the first global power has managed to stuck itself and its faithful allies. Besides the fact that the most active form of the initial opposition to Iraq?s invasion came from Europe (France, Germany, Belgium), it is clear that all European forces first involved next to Washington and London (Spain, The Netherlands, Poland, and soon Italy) have progressively pulled out. Given the pain experienced due to Iraq (on the field as much as in terms of domestic politics), it is highly improbable that European governments will support any future US military adventure, unless their countries are under direct threat. We shall come back on this aspect in the third part of the present paper, but threat perception is less and less convergent between the EU and the US.
This reaction by European leaders was predictable and reflects a radical and durable trend of the European public opinion during the Iraq crisis which led to the invasion of the country. It is from this crisis that a common public opinion emerged for the first time in the European Union [1] , that citizens from Budapest to Helsinki, from Lisbon to Stockholm, were touched by the same ? vib ?. At the time, this major positive trend in the EU took place in reaction against the Bush Administration. But his re-election, the deadlock in Iraq, Abou Graib, Guantanamo, CIA renditions, and other similar oppositions to the bottom-line of the action, have progressively transformed this opposition to one specific US administration into a distrust, see a rejection, towards the American leadership as a whole. A leadership is accepted when based on a feeling of material and moral superiority. These past years have seriously questioned both parts of the equation. The dominant trend at play within the European public opinion is to question vehemently the very relevance of the Alliance, and whether Europeans and Americans share the same values any longer. A clear sign of the crisis is to be found in the UK, NATO?s central pillar in Europe, where in the past months various military, judicial and religious high representatives expressed their conviction that values from both sides of the Atlantic were no longer the same. Such convictions are now dominant all over the continent. Even new EU-member states are affected by the trend and they too pullout from Iraq under the pressure of their public opinion.
In Turkey, the least ? typical ? member of the Alliance, the situation is more and more unclear since the US invaded Iraq (Turkish populations are now overwhelmingly hostile to the US [2] ) and since Turkey?s EU integration entered a deadlock due to EU populations? hostility to the project. In the years to come, domestic trends in Turkey will give ground to all the forces that consider that the country?s future is also (see ?mostly?) in the Muslim world, in particular in the Middle-East. This discovery will diminish NATO?s power of attraction (whose ? reward ?, EU entry as promised by Washington, appears less and less certain) and will strengthen distrust as regards to its objectives and ? added-values ?.
Transatlantic divergences on threat evaluation ? or the question of the Alliance?s ? added-value ?
This question of the Alliance?s ? added-value ? is at the core of all the discussions which will lead to the ?great debate? (or ?great washing?) of the Riga summit. A military alliance is worth anything if it can protect from the military threats anticipated by each of its members. In case the threat assessment by some of its members or by some groups among its members begins to diverge, the destiny of the military alliance is endangered. Once the assessment fully diverged, the alliance is dead even if it continues to exist formally in order to prevent obvious signs of rupture (which diplomats hate) to appear.
And it is a fact that both sides of the Atlantic no longer have converging threat evaluation. The Iran crisis provides the most obvious example of this situation: the Europeans, London included, reject any military intervention, while Washington strives to put back the option at the centre of the debate. But other examples are provided by the fact that for the Europeans, terrorism should not become an ?obsession? to the point of threatening civil liberties; or by the fact that Europeans feel more concerned by natural risks (global heating, pollution, epidemics?) and global social imbalances (poverty, hunger?) as sources of catastrophes, conflicts, terrorism and uncontrolable migrations, while the US remain focussed on classical or new (terrorism, rogue states?) military threats.
These ? expert quarrels ? hide two different visions of the world and convey different ways of preventing threats. From an EU perspective, these means are mostly to be built, see invented, and require the active participation of the other continents, from the other global players such as China, Russia, India, Brazil?. These means include military aspects of course too (and the Europeans are reorganising their armaments industry [3] in order to rationalize this aspect of their future security policy) , but only partly since the Europeans consider that threats are largely non-military and require judicial, commercial, political, scientific, humanitarian approaches? From a US perspective, military means are first and foremost envisaged to the detriment of other approaches (Katrina is a sad result of this policy), namely because the US own an immense war machine in need to justify its existence and related costs. In this case, the defence system programmes the threat. Even if some new EU- and NATO members continue to see Russia as a direct and concrete threat to EU security, the large majority of Europeans see Moscow as an unpredictable partner, to watch over and manage firmly, but by no means as a mortal danger. Europe has returned to its ?usual? historic situation from before the October Revolution.
Concerning the Arab and Muslim world, the Europeans do not share US fantasies that they will invade Europe and the world. Some extremists certainly do. But for most Europeans, the challenge is to prevent their madness to grow on to these countries? populations, and that requires to do exactly the opposite of what the US is currently doing in Iraq. A double divergence therefore: on the content and on the means? reflecting the current debates conducted within NATO.
In November 2006, the Europeans will most probably give way to Washington?s desire to enlarge NATO to non European countries and integrate members from the rest of the world into some sort of an ? Alliance of Democracies ?, but this geographic expansion will result in a dilution of the operational military aspect of the Alliance, in an acceleration of the common European defence and in the diversification of the Alliance?s armaments suppliers.
