Supreme Court overturns rule on right to counsel

Lumi

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Supreme Court overturns rule on right to counsel


Ed Brayton
Science Blogs
May 31, 2009
The U.S. Supreme Court has overturned a landmark 1986 ruling that forbid the police from questioning suspects without their attorney present. The 1986 case, Michigan v Jackson, was overturned on Tuesday in a 5-4 ruling (PDF) in a similar case, Montejo v Louisiana.

As I reported last month, the Obama administration had sided with the state of Louisiana in that case and argued for overturning the prior case.

Michigan v Jackson established the rule that if someone accused of a crime has an attorney or has requested the appointment of an attorney by the court, police may not question them without that attorney being present even if the accused agrees to waive the right to have their attorney present during that particular session of questioning. Under Jackson, any waiver of that right was presumed to be invalid because it was not made with the advice of counsel.

Justice Scalia, writing the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Thomas and Kennedy, said ?the marginal benefits of Jackson (viz., the number of confessions obtained coercively that are suppressed by its bright-line rule and would otherwise have been admitted) are dwarfed by its substantial costs (viz., hindering ?society?s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.? (citations omitted)


?This provoked an angry response from the dissenting justices, led by Justice Stevens, who took the unusual step of reading his dissenting opinion aloud from the bench. The majority, he wrote, ?flagrantly misrepresents? the issues of the case and has ?overrule[d] Jackson to correct a ?theoretical and doctrinal? problem of its own imagining.? Such tough language is usually aimed by Justice Scalia, not at him.

A group of 19 former judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials, including prominent conservatives like former FBI Director William Sessions and former Bush administration Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, filed an amicus brief (PDF) arguing strongly against overturning Jackson.

Their brief argues that the Jackson ruling ?provides an easily enforceable rule governing post-arraignment custodial interrogations,? that the ?simplicity and clarity of the rule facilitate the training of police officers? and ?provides judges a straightforward, objective standard to determine whether those confessions are admissible.?

?Absent such a clear test,? they argue, ?law enforcement personnel, prosecutors, and trial judges will have to start anew in developing a common law from particularized decisions reflecting inherently subjective assessments of the tactics as well as the intent of investigators, the timing as well as the content of interrogations, and the understanding as well as the free will of defendants.?

Their brief also argues that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment goes beyond merely preserving the adversary process and that the Jackson rule protects crucial Fifth Amendment due process protections that help ensure a fair trial and public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system:

Third, Jackson links two key criminal procedural rights ? the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Gideon v. Wainwright and the Fifth Amendment rights of an accused under Miranda ? which are fundamental to the adversary process and maintain public confidence in our criminal justice system. Discarding Jackson would undermine both rights. Allowing the police to initiate interrogation of a represented defendant and to use any resulting statements would strip away protections the attorney can provide, interfere with the relationship between counsel and client, and undercut the integrity of criminal trials?To abandon a rule that safeguards them would erode the public confidence they foster. It would signal that enduring legal principles and important constitutional rights are no longer so enduring nor so important.

Just another example of the Obama administration adopting Bush administration positions and undermining constitutional protections.
 

Lumi

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
MONTEJO v. LOUISIANA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 07?1529. Argued January 13, 2009?Decided May 26, 2009
At a preliminary hearing required by Louisiana law, petitioner Montejo was charged with first-degree murder, and the court ordered the ap-pointment of counsel. Later that day, the police read Montejo his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, and he agreed to goalong on a trip to locate the murder weapon. During the excursion,he wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim?s widow. Uponreturning, he finally met his court-appointed attorney. At trial, his letter was admitted over defense objection, and he was convicted andsentenced to death. Affirming, the State Supreme Court rejected his claim that the letter should have been suppressed under the rule of Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625, which forbids police to initiateinterrogation of a criminal defendant once he has invoked his right tocounsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding. The court reasoned that Jackson?s prophylactic protection is not triggered unless the de-fendant has actually requested a lawyer or has otherwise assertedhis Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and that, since Montejo stoodmute at his hearing while the judge ordered the appointment ofcounsel, he had made no such request or assertion.
Held:
1. Michigan v. Jackson should be and now is overruled. Pp. 3?18.
(a)
The State Supreme Court?s interpretation of Jackson would lead to practical problems. Requiring an initial ?invocation? of theright to counsel in order to trigger the Jackson presumption, as thecourt below did, might work in States that require an indigent defen-dant formally to request counsel before an appointment is made, butnot in more than half the States, which appoint counsel without re-quest from the defendant. Pp. 3?6.
(b)
On the other hand, Montejo?s solution is untenable as a theo-retical and doctrinal matter. Eliminating the invocation requirement entirely would depart fundamentally from the rationale of Jackson, whose presumption was created by analogy to a similar prophylacticrule established in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, to protect the Fifth Amendment-based Miranda right. Both Edwards and Jackson are meant to prevent police from badgering defendants into changing their minds about the right to counsel once they have invoked it, buta defendant who never asked for counsel has not yet made up his mind in the first instance. Pp. 6?13.

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-1529.pdf
 

Lumi

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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
This brief is filed on behalf of numerous
former federal and state law enforcement officers,
prosecutors, and judges who believe thatMichigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), provides bright-line
guidance for post-arraignment custodial
interrogations, that the decision promotes fair,
effective law enforcement, and that overturning it
would sow confusion and undermine our criminal
justice system.1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Twenty-three years ago, this Court in Jackson
held that if police initiate interrogation after
attachment of the right to counsel, where the
defendant has a lawyer or has requested a lawyer,
waiver of the right to counsel for that interrogation
is invalid. Since then, this rule -- like the rule in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) -- ?has
become embedded in routine police practice.?
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
Under the most basic precepts of stare decisis,
overruling Jackson, and departing radically from
well-settled precedent, requires ?special
justification.? Id. (citations omitted). As the Court
has observed, a constitutional decision, particularly
one that enforces fundamental liberties, should
stand unless it has proven ?outdated, ill-founded,
unworkable, or otherwise legitimately vulnerable to
serious reconsideration? for ?articulable reasons.?
See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986).


http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/thompson-et-al-brief-4-14-09.pdf
 

bjfinste

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It doesn't *overturn* the right to counsel (it didn't overrule Gideon v. Wainwright) but it does weaken it and places a burden on the accused who are often simply not knowledgeable as far as how to invoke that right. All in all, the decision is a travesty, and wouldn't have happened prior to that wackjob Alito getting on the court.

Back to bar study...
 
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