The New York Post | April 8, 2003
As many as six Iraqi divisions barely fired a shot
and evaded orders to attack allied forces.
Chemical weapons still have not been used, despite
Iraqi commanders receiving permission to employ
them. Secret bunkers and executive hide-outs
have been hit, with more success than the world
yet knows. Behind the precedent-setting advance
to Baghdad, a secret war has long been underway.
It began months - years - before the first
precision strike initiated this conflict. And it
is so complex and sensitive that many details will
not be revealed in our lifetimes. If you want
to understand the risks this secret war has
enabled our forces to run, just look at a map.
The sweeping attack by the Marines on the right of
the allied advance leaves a long vulnerable flank.
That flank faces the Iranian border - where Iraq's army has maintained heavy concentrations for over two decades. Some of
the divisions positioned near Iran in the south resisted surrendering and had to be destroyed.
But others, deeper inside Iraq, did not attempt to
stage significant counterattacks. A number of
divisions scattered around Iraq simply remained
inactive. We hear a great deal about
intelligence failure - but this war has seen
remarkable intelligence successes. Even the
appearance of Saddam's Fedayeen thugs in large numbers was no surprise o the intel community - the reports were
available, but civilian decision makers in the
Pentagon dismissed them. From the CIA to special
operations forces, our activities have been
comprehensive and effective. Some missions are
covert, meaning they can be revealed after the
fact. Others are clandestine and will remain
shrouded from public view. But both types have
been strikingly successful. American agents
working with Iraqi intermediaries were able to cut
deals with some division commanders (as well as
making different deals with other Iraqi
officers). Their units would not surrender
outright - no white flags would go up - thus
preserving their pride and maintaining a degree of
unit integrity. Just sitting there in place also
gave officers' relatives some protection from
Saddam's vengeance: By "delaying" their
participation in the war, they remained a viable
force that punitive actions by the regime would
only alienate. Baghdad kept expecting those
divisions to join the fight. This inactivity was
not as dramatic as if the units had rallied to the
coalition. But it was an intelligent compromise.
And guess who will form the backbone of the armed
forces of liberated Iraq? Many of the divisional
cadres have melted away - deserted, at least for
now - but those who remain will be crucial to
building Iraq's future defense forces. Regarding
chemical weapons, a combination of psychological
operations and quiet pressure on Iraqi
commanders, along with ferocious attacks on
delivery systems, has kept these munitions out of
the war thus far.
Reporters keep badgering briefers with questions as
to why chemical weapons have not yet been found,
but our commanders and troops are simply relieved
that they have not been used. Many Iraqi
officers and officials have been sitting on the
fence, waiting to see which way the war would go.
Even that is a victory for our intelligence
agents. If not openly supportive of our efforts,
neither did these Iraqis seriously oppose them.
They were neutralized, and their inaction helps
explain the lethargy of the regime's attempts to
respond to the allied advance. With each new day,
however, more Iraqis begin to cooperate. Even
before the war, high-level contacts provided
targeting information. Now the trickles of
information are building toward flood-stage.
Local residents tell our forces where arms caches
or Ba'ath Party strongholds are located. Captured officers
reveal piece after piece of Saddam's defensive
plans. And still more regime officials are
quietly shifting to back the winning side as they
maneuver to survive Saddam's fall. Yet even
these remarkable intelligence successes are minor
compared to what lies ahead. Much has been
written about the seismic effects this war will
have on the cruel, moribund states and societies
of the Middle East. And we are, indeed,
rewriting the region's future.
But we will soon be able to rewrite its past, as
well. Access to Iraqi intelligence archives and
the interrogation of high-level prisoners will
enable us to reconstruct the secret history of
the Middle East over the past 35 years.
Certainly, we shall learn a great deal more about
the atrocities of Saddam's regime. But the
information of far greater value will be what we
learn about the regime's relationships not only
with other rogue states, but with our long-term
"allies" in the Arab world and beyond. The Iraqi
regime was a bureaucracy of terror. But it was,
above all, a bureaucracy. It kept voluminous
files. The secret police, diplomatic and executive
archives will hold information on all the region's
secret deals, as well as on the private lives and
personal corruption of virtually every leader,
cabinet member and senior military officer
throughout the Middle East. Syria must be
terrified of what we'll find. But Egypt is
doubtless plenty worried, too. And the files on
Saudi princes are not going to be publishable as
family reading. We are in for some shocks as we
learn of unsuspected betrayals. But the states
of the region will be in for much greater
surprises in the coming years. It has been noted
that the French and Russians did not want this war
because they knew we would learn how they cheated
on U.N. sanctions against Iraq.
But the treasure trove of information we will
collect on the Arab world and other Islamic
states will be much more important. It will enable
us to see into previously opaque issues and to
squeeze many a corrupt leader who believed he was
safe from external scrutiny. The Iraqi archives
will be a mother lode of information for scholars.
But there is much we will choose to keep under
lock and key for strategic purposes. The
psychological effects of our access to those
archives and to former regime officials anxious to
tell all will be even greater than the practical
information we accumulate. No Arab leader will
know what was or wasn't in those files. Each will
have to fear the worst. President-for-life X
will always have to wonder what we know as we sit
across the negotiating table. Our immediate goal
will be to help the Iraqi people build the first
rule-of-law democracy in the Middle East. That
will bring its own rewards. But the long-term
dividends we will reap from our secret war will
keep paying off for decades. The destruction of
Saddam's regime will result in the greatest
intelligence coup in history. Ralph Peters is a
retired military intelligence officer and the
author of "Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing
World."
As many as six Iraqi divisions barely fired a shot
and evaded orders to attack allied forces.
Chemical weapons still have not been used, despite
Iraqi commanders receiving permission to employ
them. Secret bunkers and executive hide-outs
have been hit, with more success than the world
yet knows. Behind the precedent-setting advance
to Baghdad, a secret war has long been underway.
It began months - years - before the first
precision strike initiated this conflict. And it
is so complex and sensitive that many details will
not be revealed in our lifetimes. If you want
to understand the risks this secret war has
enabled our forces to run, just look at a map.
The sweeping attack by the Marines on the right of
the allied advance leaves a long vulnerable flank.
That flank faces the Iranian border - where Iraq's army has maintained heavy concentrations for over two decades. Some of
the divisions positioned near Iran in the south resisted surrendering and had to be destroyed.
But others, deeper inside Iraq, did not attempt to
stage significant counterattacks. A number of
divisions scattered around Iraq simply remained
inactive. We hear a great deal about
intelligence failure - but this war has seen
remarkable intelligence successes. Even the
appearance of Saddam's Fedayeen thugs in large numbers was no surprise o the intel community - the reports were
available, but civilian decision makers in the
Pentagon dismissed them. From the CIA to special
operations forces, our activities have been
comprehensive and effective. Some missions are
covert, meaning they can be revealed after the
fact. Others are clandestine and will remain
shrouded from public view. But both types have
been strikingly successful. American agents
working with Iraqi intermediaries were able to cut
deals with some division commanders (as well as
making different deals with other Iraqi
officers). Their units would not surrender
outright - no white flags would go up - thus
preserving their pride and maintaining a degree of
unit integrity. Just sitting there in place also
gave officers' relatives some protection from
Saddam's vengeance: By "delaying" their
participation in the war, they remained a viable
force that punitive actions by the regime would
only alienate. Baghdad kept expecting those
divisions to join the fight. This inactivity was
not as dramatic as if the units had rallied to the
coalition. But it was an intelligent compromise.
And guess who will form the backbone of the armed
forces of liberated Iraq? Many of the divisional
cadres have melted away - deserted, at least for
now - but those who remain will be crucial to
building Iraq's future defense forces. Regarding
chemical weapons, a combination of psychological
operations and quiet pressure on Iraqi
commanders, along with ferocious attacks on
delivery systems, has kept these munitions out of
the war thus far.
Reporters keep badgering briefers with questions as
to why chemical weapons have not yet been found,
but our commanders and troops are simply relieved
that they have not been used. Many Iraqi
officers and officials have been sitting on the
fence, waiting to see which way the war would go.
Even that is a victory for our intelligence
agents. If not openly supportive of our efforts,
neither did these Iraqis seriously oppose them.
They were neutralized, and their inaction helps
explain the lethargy of the regime's attempts to
respond to the allied advance. With each new day,
however, more Iraqis begin to cooperate. Even
before the war, high-level contacts provided
targeting information. Now the trickles of
information are building toward flood-stage.
Local residents tell our forces where arms caches
or Ba'ath Party strongholds are located. Captured officers
reveal piece after piece of Saddam's defensive
plans. And still more regime officials are
quietly shifting to back the winning side as they
maneuver to survive Saddam's fall. Yet even
these remarkable intelligence successes are minor
compared to what lies ahead. Much has been
written about the seismic effects this war will
have on the cruel, moribund states and societies
of the Middle East. And we are, indeed,
rewriting the region's future.
But we will soon be able to rewrite its past, as
well. Access to Iraqi intelligence archives and
the interrogation of high-level prisoners will
enable us to reconstruct the secret history of
the Middle East over the past 35 years.
Certainly, we shall learn a great deal more about
the atrocities of Saddam's regime. But the
information of far greater value will be what we
learn about the regime's relationships not only
with other rogue states, but with our long-term
"allies" in the Arab world and beyond. The Iraqi
regime was a bureaucracy of terror. But it was,
above all, a bureaucracy. It kept voluminous
files. The secret police, diplomatic and executive
archives will hold information on all the region's
secret deals, as well as on the private lives and
personal corruption of virtually every leader,
cabinet member and senior military officer
throughout the Middle East. Syria must be
terrified of what we'll find. But Egypt is
doubtless plenty worried, too. And the files on
Saudi princes are not going to be publishable as
family reading. We are in for some shocks as we
learn of unsuspected betrayals. But the states
of the region will be in for much greater
surprises in the coming years. It has been noted
that the French and Russians did not want this war
because they knew we would learn how they cheated
on U.N. sanctions against Iraq.
But the treasure trove of information we will
collect on the Arab world and other Islamic
states will be much more important. It will enable
us to see into previously opaque issues and to
squeeze many a corrupt leader who believed he was
safe from external scrutiny. The Iraqi archives
will be a mother lode of information for scholars.
But there is much we will choose to keep under
lock and key for strategic purposes. The
psychological effects of our access to those
archives and to former regime officials anxious to
tell all will be even greater than the practical
information we accumulate. No Arab leader will
know what was or wasn't in those files. Each will
have to fear the worst. President-for-life X
will always have to wonder what we know as we sit
across the negotiating table. Our immediate goal
will be to help the Iraqi people build the first
rule-of-law democracy in the Middle East. That
will bring its own rewards. But the long-term
dividends we will reap from our secret war will
keep paying off for decades. The destruction of
Saddam's regime will result in the greatest
intelligence coup in history. Ralph Peters is a
retired military intelligence officer and the
author of "Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing
World."
