Reports show plans to attack Pakistan bases stymied by turf battles, missteps
By MARK MAZZETTI and DAVID ROHDE
New York Times
June 30, 2008
WASHINGTON ? Late last year, top Bush administration officials drafted a secret plan to authorize the Pentagon's Special Operations forces to launch missions into the mountains of Pakistan to capture or kill top leaders of al-Qaida.
Intelligence reports for more than a year had been streaming in about Osama bin Laden's terror network rebuilding in the Pakistani tribal areas, a problem that had been exacerbated by years of missteps in Washington and the Pakistani capital, Islamabad; sharp policy disagreements; and turf battles between U.S. counterterrorism agencies.
The new plan, outlined in a highly classified Pentagon order, was designed to eliminate some of those battles.
And it was meant to pave an easier path into the tribal areas for U.S. commandos, who for years have bristled at what they see as Washington's risk-averse attitude toward Special Operations missions inside Pakistan. They also argue catching bin Laden will come only by capturing some of his senior lieutenants alive.
But more than six months later, the Special Operations forces are still waiting for the green light. The plan has been held up in Washington by the very disagreements it was meant to eliminate.
Al-Qaida's new growth
After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, President Bush committed the nation to a "war on terrorism" and made the destruction of bin Laden's network a top priority. But it is increasingly clear the Bush administration will leave office with al-Qaida having successfully relocated its base from Afghanistan to Pakistan's tribal areas, where it has rebuilt much of its ability to attack from the region and broadcast its messages.
A recent U.S. airstrike killing Pakistani troops has only inflamed tensions along the mountain border and added to tensions between Washington and Pakistan's new government. How al-Qaida has gained a new haven is in part a story of U.S. accommodation to President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, whose advisers played down the terrorist threat. It also is a story of how the White House shifted its sights, beginning in 2002, from counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan to preparations for the war in Iraq.
Just as it had on Sept. 10, 2001, al-Qaida now has a band of terror camps from which to plan and train for attacks against Western targets.
Officials say the new camps are smaller than the ones the group used prior to 2001. However, despite dozens of U.S. missile strikes in Pakistan since 2002, one retired CIA officer estimated that the makeshift training compounds have as many as 2,000 Arab and Pakistani militants, up from several hundred three years ago.
Publicly, senior U.S. and Pakistani officials have said the creation of an al-Qaida haven in the tribal areas was in many ways inevitable, that the lawless badlands where ethnic Pashtun tribes have resisted government control for centuries were a natural place for a dispirited terror network to find refuge.
The U.S. and Pakistani officials also blame a disastrous cease-fire brokered between the Pakistani government and militants in 2006.
But more than four dozen interviews in Washington and Pakistan tell another story. U.S. intelligence officials say that the al-Qaida hunt in Pakistan, code-named Operation Cannonball by the CIA in 2006, was often undermined by bitter disagreements within the Bush administration and within the CIA, including about whether U.S. commandos should launch ground raids inside the tribal areas.
Inside the CIA, the fights included clashes between the agency's outposts in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Islamabad. There also were battles between field officers and the counterterrorism center at CIA headquarters, whose preference for carrying out raids remotely, via Predator missile strikes, was derided by officers in the Islamabad station as the work of "boys with toys."
An early arrangement that allowed U.S. commandos to join Pakistani units on raids inside the tribal areas was halted in 2003 after protests in Pakistan.
Another combat mission that came within hours of being launched in 2005 was scuttled because some CIA officials in Pakistan questioned the accuracy of the intelligence, and because aides to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld believed that the mission force had become too large.
Shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks, Musharraf allowed U.S. forces to use Pakistani bases to support the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, while Pakistani intelligence services worked closely with the CIA in tracking down al-Qaida operatives.
Pakistan's role
But from their vantage point in Afghanistan, the picture looked different to U.S. Special Operations forces who saw signs that the militants whom the Americans had driven out of Afghanistan were effectively regrouping in Pakistan.
When U.S. military officials proposed in 2002 that Special Operations forces be allowed to establish bases in the tribal areas, Pakistan flatly refused. Instead, a small number of "black" Special Operations forces ? Army Delta Force and Navy SEAL units ? were allowed to accompany Pakistani forces on raids in the tribal areas in 2002 and early 2003.
That arrangement only angered both sides. U.S. forces used to operating on their own believed the Pakistanis were limiting their movements. And while Pakistani officials publicly denied the presence of Americans, local tribesmen spotted the Americans and protested their presence.
Under pressure from Pakistan, the Bush administration decided in 2003 to end the U.S. military presence.
In order to keep pressure on the Pakistanis about the tribal areas, officials decided to have Bush raise the issue in phone calls with Musharraf.
The conversations backfired. Two former U.S. government officials say they were surprised and frustrated when instead of demanding action from Musharraf, Bush instead repeatedly thanked him for his contributions to the war on terrorism.
Intragovernmental battles raged over the plan in early 2005 for a Special Operations mission intended to capture Ayman al-Zawahri, bin Laden's top deputy.
In the end, the mission was aborted after Rumsfeld refused to give his approval for it.
Leading terrorism experts have warned that it is only a matter of time before a major terrorist attack planned in the mountains of Pakistan is carried out on American soil.
"The United States faces a threat from al-Qaida today that is comparable to what it faced on Sept. 11, 2001," said Seth Jones, a Pentagon consultant and a terrorism expert at RAND Corp.
"Stay the course! " - George W. Bush, April 13, 2004
By MARK MAZZETTI and DAVID ROHDE
New York Times
June 30, 2008
WASHINGTON ? Late last year, top Bush administration officials drafted a secret plan to authorize the Pentagon's Special Operations forces to launch missions into the mountains of Pakistan to capture or kill top leaders of al-Qaida.
Intelligence reports for more than a year had been streaming in about Osama bin Laden's terror network rebuilding in the Pakistani tribal areas, a problem that had been exacerbated by years of missteps in Washington and the Pakistani capital, Islamabad; sharp policy disagreements; and turf battles between U.S. counterterrorism agencies.
The new plan, outlined in a highly classified Pentagon order, was designed to eliminate some of those battles.
And it was meant to pave an easier path into the tribal areas for U.S. commandos, who for years have bristled at what they see as Washington's risk-averse attitude toward Special Operations missions inside Pakistan. They also argue catching bin Laden will come only by capturing some of his senior lieutenants alive.
But more than six months later, the Special Operations forces are still waiting for the green light. The plan has been held up in Washington by the very disagreements it was meant to eliminate.
Al-Qaida's new growth
After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, President Bush committed the nation to a "war on terrorism" and made the destruction of bin Laden's network a top priority. But it is increasingly clear the Bush administration will leave office with al-Qaida having successfully relocated its base from Afghanistan to Pakistan's tribal areas, where it has rebuilt much of its ability to attack from the region and broadcast its messages.
A recent U.S. airstrike killing Pakistani troops has only inflamed tensions along the mountain border and added to tensions between Washington and Pakistan's new government. How al-Qaida has gained a new haven is in part a story of U.S. accommodation to President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, whose advisers played down the terrorist threat. It also is a story of how the White House shifted its sights, beginning in 2002, from counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan to preparations for the war in Iraq.
Just as it had on Sept. 10, 2001, al-Qaida now has a band of terror camps from which to plan and train for attacks against Western targets.
Officials say the new camps are smaller than the ones the group used prior to 2001. However, despite dozens of U.S. missile strikes in Pakistan since 2002, one retired CIA officer estimated that the makeshift training compounds have as many as 2,000 Arab and Pakistani militants, up from several hundred three years ago.
Publicly, senior U.S. and Pakistani officials have said the creation of an al-Qaida haven in the tribal areas was in many ways inevitable, that the lawless badlands where ethnic Pashtun tribes have resisted government control for centuries were a natural place for a dispirited terror network to find refuge.
The U.S. and Pakistani officials also blame a disastrous cease-fire brokered between the Pakistani government and militants in 2006.
But more than four dozen interviews in Washington and Pakistan tell another story. U.S. intelligence officials say that the al-Qaida hunt in Pakistan, code-named Operation Cannonball by the CIA in 2006, was often undermined by bitter disagreements within the Bush administration and within the CIA, including about whether U.S. commandos should launch ground raids inside the tribal areas.
Inside the CIA, the fights included clashes between the agency's outposts in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Islamabad. There also were battles between field officers and the counterterrorism center at CIA headquarters, whose preference for carrying out raids remotely, via Predator missile strikes, was derided by officers in the Islamabad station as the work of "boys with toys."
An early arrangement that allowed U.S. commandos to join Pakistani units on raids inside the tribal areas was halted in 2003 after protests in Pakistan.
Another combat mission that came within hours of being launched in 2005 was scuttled because some CIA officials in Pakistan questioned the accuracy of the intelligence, and because aides to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld believed that the mission force had become too large.
Shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks, Musharraf allowed U.S. forces to use Pakistani bases to support the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, while Pakistani intelligence services worked closely with the CIA in tracking down al-Qaida operatives.
Pakistan's role
But from their vantage point in Afghanistan, the picture looked different to U.S. Special Operations forces who saw signs that the militants whom the Americans had driven out of Afghanistan were effectively regrouping in Pakistan.
When U.S. military officials proposed in 2002 that Special Operations forces be allowed to establish bases in the tribal areas, Pakistan flatly refused. Instead, a small number of "black" Special Operations forces ? Army Delta Force and Navy SEAL units ? were allowed to accompany Pakistani forces on raids in the tribal areas in 2002 and early 2003.
That arrangement only angered both sides. U.S. forces used to operating on their own believed the Pakistanis were limiting their movements. And while Pakistani officials publicly denied the presence of Americans, local tribesmen spotted the Americans and protested their presence.
Under pressure from Pakistan, the Bush administration decided in 2003 to end the U.S. military presence.
In order to keep pressure on the Pakistanis about the tribal areas, officials decided to have Bush raise the issue in phone calls with Musharraf.
The conversations backfired. Two former U.S. government officials say they were surprised and frustrated when instead of demanding action from Musharraf, Bush instead repeatedly thanked him for his contributions to the war on terrorism.
Intragovernmental battles raged over the plan in early 2005 for a Special Operations mission intended to capture Ayman al-Zawahri, bin Laden's top deputy.
In the end, the mission was aborted after Rumsfeld refused to give his approval for it.
Leading terrorism experts have warned that it is only a matter of time before a major terrorist attack planned in the mountains of Pakistan is carried out on American soil.
"The United States faces a threat from al-Qaida today that is comparable to what it faced on Sept. 11, 2001," said Seth Jones, a Pentagon consultant and a terrorism expert at RAND Corp.
"Stay the course! " - George W. Bush, April 13, 2004
Last edited:
