If was a coach I would never have made that call, because of all of the backlash involved with not converting it. That being said , Bill has to be considered one of the best coaches ever, so he has alot of leeway. I started thinking about this call and this is what I came up with: My guess was the colts had about an 85% chance of scoring a td after taking over at the 28 and with all the momentum they had built up, mannings incredible ability to cash in last minute drives etc.,the colts home field advantage, and the pats inexperieced defense. If they punt barring a major return, they would have had the ball at their 30-35. It doesnt take manning long to go 40 yards and be right back where they started with the ball at the 28. I would guesstimate that the colts would have had a 55%-60% chance of marching the ball down the field , factoring in again, their momentum , manning etc. So my thought are that the pats would have had a 25-30% better chance of stopping them from scoring a td, from their own 30-35. All that being said the pats were converting 4th and 2's or less almost 70% of the time, and if they converted this one the game was over and won by the Pats. Not sure how to run the %'s but my guess is his decision % speaking would result in wins slightly more than loses(keep in mind the pats have the best offense in the league). Oh, by the way I cant stand Bellichick(though I would love to have him as the eagles coach) and enjoyed watching his contorted face! This added dimension of play calling would make it awfully difficult to make wagers on games with suffering a stroke!
Funny, this came out an half an hour after my post: from espn
Doing the math on Belichick's decision
One formula seems to validate Patriots' fourth-down call
November 16, 2009, 3:51 PM
By: Alok Pattani, ESPN Stats & Information
Many are questioning Bill Belichick's decision to go for it on fourth down late in the fourth quarter of the Patriots' loss to the Colts on Sunday night, but is the decision defensible when looking at the numbers? Let's take at a stats-based risk-reward analysis of going for it in this situation.
There are four variables that need to be accounted for in making this decision:
1. The Patriots' chances of winning the game if they converted the fourth down.
2. The Patriots' chances of winning the game if they did not convert the fourth down.
3. The Patriots' chances of winning the game if they punted the ball.
4. The Patriots' chances of converting the fourth down.
The "Advanced NFL Stats" Web site was used to calculate the win probability. This metric uses NFL averages (taking into account time left, score differential, down and distance) and is not an exact representation of how likely the Patriots were to win, but does provide very good estimates for this purposes.
Let's go through it step by step:
1. If they converted the fourth down, the Patriots would have had a first-and-10 on roughly their own 30 with 2 minutes to go. Their average win probability in this situation would be 92 percent. You could argue that with the Colts only having one timeout left, the game would be over if New England converted, but there is a chance Indy would still get the ball back with a little bit of time left, so we'll stick with the 92 percent chance of winning the game.
2. If the Pats failed to convert the fourth down (which happened), they would give the Colts the ball (with a first-and-10) on roughly the New England 29-yard line with 2 minutes to go. The Patriots' win probability in this situation would be 66 percent.
3) If they punted the ball, using Patriots punter Chris Hanson's average of 44 net yards per punt in the game, the Colts would have gotten the ball (with a first-and-10) at the Indianapolis 28. The Patriots' win probability in this situation would be 79 percent.
4) The Patriots' chance of converting the fourth down varies based on how you look at it. The league average going for it on fourth-and-2 over the past two seasons (not including the Patriots' play Sunday) is 55.7 percent (49-for-88). The Patriots were 3-for-4 in that situation over the past two years entering Sunday night's final call. The Colts' defense allowed opponents two conversions in three opportunities on fourth-and-2 over the past two seasons entering Sunday night. Even though this indicates that the Patriots were more likely to convert than the league average, let's just say their chance of converting is the league-average rate of 55.7 percent.
Using these numbers, we can calculate the Patriots' expected win probability in both situations (going for it and not going for it):
Expected Win Probability When Going For It = (Probability of Success) * (Win Probability If Success) + (Probability of Failure) * (Win Probability if Failure) = .557 X .92 + (1-.557) * .66 = 0.805
Expected Win Probability When Punting (based on item No. 3 above) = 0.79
The result: .805 is greater than 0.79, so Expected Win Probability When Going For It is greater than Expected Win Probability When Punting.
Using these estimates, the decision is very close. The Patriots' expected win probability when going for it is greater than the expected win probability when punting, but by just 1.5 percent. If you say that the Colts and Peyton Manning had a greater chance of coming back after the missed fourth down conversion than the 34 percent given to them by the league average, this can be accounted for by reducing the .66 in the calculation above.
However, then you'd probably also give them better than the 21 percent chance to come back if the Patriots had punted, so you'd have to decrease the win probability when punting from 0.79. Most likely, you end up with a close decision either way. The "Advanced NFL Stats" Web site has its own (similar) analysis here.
