Protecting your money maybe. Comments on why Cheney invested on the dollar crashing is another story. Not one of these phony conservatives will touch it. In their minds they probably look at it as a successful business move on Cheney's part.
China and US money woes
- Thread starter THE KOD
- Start date
Protecting your money maybe. Comments on why Cheney invested on the dollar crashing is another story. Not one of these phony conservatives will touch it. In their minds they probably look at it as a successful business move on Cheney's part.
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Well I found the one about Duct tape and Cheney but no where does it say that he held shares in duct tape or links him to duct tape lobbys.
Whats to keep someone from investing say 100 million in tomato futures. Then taking a trip to mexico and tainting tomatoes so Jack can't enjoy his tomato sandwhichs for 3 or 4 weeks, and then sit back and watch the tomato futures fall and cash the fawk in .
Thats kinda a cynical way of looking at things.
Anybody so sick to do that kind of stuff deserves to be hanged in Iran attached to a crane.
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Well I expect DTB and gardenweasel in here at any time commenting on Cheney and his
wheeling dealing methods to gain wealth.
:0corn
China really is not unpredictable at all. They are quite predictable, actually.
They will not attack Taiwan under any of the current conditions of the geo-political landscape.
I agree with Wayne on this one.
Not on his silly comparison of US/Japan, but China is not invading Taiwan.
With all the talk about about the US, China, and Taiwan one really has to look at the simple fact. China cannot invade at this time.
Why?
1) China lacks the amphibious capacity to move enough troops over
2) Any attempt to airlift in the necessary equipment/troops would in all likelyhood be decimated by Taiwans Pac 2's and thier AF.
3) For all thier thugary, the ChiCom leadership seems to understand that in order to take over Taiwan they would in essence have to burn it down. If they are persuing a scorched earth policy, then there may not be much the US or Taiwan can do to stop them. However, I think they want and need to keep Taiwan viable for thier own economy. Can you imagine the efficiency of slave labor coupled to the quality controll and moderinzation that Taiwan posseses?????
4) The US would not stand by and allow Taiwan to be taken by conventional means. Aside from being a great customer from our planes and weapons systems we also benifit from an economic/industrial standpoint.
5) China can sabre rattle all they want, but can they affort to piss off thier most important trading partner the US?
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Militarily I doubt we could respond with much help right now or for the rest of the year.
The leverage of the debt owed to China is the main concern. If they think it would be a walk in the park, and the US would not be able to respond, I dont think the US is entering WWIII with China .
Why?
1) China lacks the amphibious capacity to move enough troops over
2) Any attempt to airlift in the necessary equipment/troops would in all likelyhood be decimated by Taiwans Pac 2's and thier AF.
3) For all thier thugary, the ChiCom leadership seems to understand that in order to take over Taiwan they would in essence have to burn it down. If they are persuing a scorched earth policy, then there may not be much the US or Taiwan can do to stop them. However, I think they want and need to keep Taiwan viable for thier own economy. Can you imagine the efficiency of slave labor coupled to the quality controll and moderinzation that Taiwan posseses?????
4) The US would not stand by and allow Taiwan to be taken by conventional means. Aside from being a great customer from our planes and weapons systems we also benifit from an economic/industrial standpoint.
5) China can sabre rattle all they want, but can they affort to piss off thier most important trading partner the US?
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Militarily I doubt we could respond with much help right now or for the rest of the year.
The leverage of the debt owed to China is the main concern. If they think it would be a walk in the park, and the US would not be able to respond, I dont think the US is entering WWIII with China .
Where in the world did *this* (in bold) nonsense come from?
Some illiterate blogger or a chain email?
It's among the most ridiculous things i've ever seen.
Post a link, Scotty.
If i'm taking weasel to task for sourcing the National Enquirer-lol- this total idiocy should be linked.
With the possible exception of 'point' #5, the other 4 are absoultely ridiculous.
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Yeh it was from a illiterate blogger I found on the subject.
There iis a ton of links to this though.
I will find one.
I like to read opposing views. This nut job might think your post was more full of shit than a christmas turkey.:shrug:
US ambassador says ?US will fight? if China invades Taiwan
Thursday, 30 August 2007, 8:12 am | 105 views
By Gerald Giam
If the People?s Republic of China decides to take Taiwan by force, the US will fight on behalf of Taiwan against the Mainland, said a former US ambassador.
Chase Untermeyer, who just completed his tour as ambassador to Qatar and is on his way back to the US, made these personal comments on Tuesday at a public lecture on ?US policy in the Middle East? at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, which was attended by about 80 government officials, foreign diplomats, academics and students.
The ambassador used the Cross Strait example to illustrate the importance the US government ? in his opinion ? places on the principles of democracy and freedom in making its foreign policy decisions. He pointed out that successive US administrations had made decisions to enter military conflicts not simply out of national interests or detailed calculations of the costs and benefits of entering the wars, but based on deep seated principles that are ?as old as the US itself?.
Untermeyer cautioned that many countries would be mistaken if they think the US conducted its foreign affairs solely on hard-nosed pragmatism, like securing oil supplies.
Defending democratic principles
In the case of an invasion of Taiwan by China, Untermeyer believes that the US will fight China not because of treaty obligations or even out of national interest, but based on its principles to defend its democratic allies against aggression. (The US? Taiwan Relations Act obliges the US to supply Taiwan with the military capability to defend itself.)
Untermeyer assessed that even if a war with China is detrimental to US economic interests, the US will still aid Taiwan if the Chinese invasion goes against the will of the Taiwanese people.
Attempting to debunk the common perception that the US is interested in the Middle East only for its oil and enriching its own oil companies, Untermeyer argued that if that were so, the US would have never created the State of Israel, knowing the unpopularity of that move in a region dominated by Arab countries. The US depends on the Middle East for a quarter of its oil supplies. He said that the European Union is much more dependent on Arab oil and therefore sees the Middle East through the prism of energy security much more than the US does.
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Thursday, 30 August 2007, 8:12 am | 105 views
By Gerald Giam
If the People?s Republic of China decides to take Taiwan by force, the US will fight on behalf of Taiwan against the Mainland, said a former US ambassador.
Chase Untermeyer, who just completed his tour as ambassador to Qatar and is on his way back to the US, made these personal comments on Tuesday at a public lecture on ?US policy in the Middle East? at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, which was attended by about 80 government officials, foreign diplomats, academics and students.
The ambassador used the Cross Strait example to illustrate the importance the US government ? in his opinion ? places on the principles of democracy and freedom in making its foreign policy decisions. He pointed out that successive US administrations had made decisions to enter military conflicts not simply out of national interests or detailed calculations of the costs and benefits of entering the wars, but based on deep seated principles that are ?as old as the US itself?.
Untermeyer cautioned that many countries would be mistaken if they think the US conducted its foreign affairs solely on hard-nosed pragmatism, like securing oil supplies.
Defending democratic principles
In the case of an invasion of Taiwan by China, Untermeyer believes that the US will fight China not because of treaty obligations or even out of national interest, but based on its principles to defend its democratic allies against aggression. (The US? Taiwan Relations Act obliges the US to supply Taiwan with the military capability to defend itself.)
Untermeyer assessed that even if a war with China is detrimental to US economic interests, the US will still aid Taiwan if the Chinese invasion goes against the will of the Taiwanese people.
Attempting to debunk the common perception that the US is interested in the Middle East only for its oil and enriching its own oil companies, Untermeyer argued that if that were so, the US would have never created the State of Israel, knowing the unpopularity of that move in a region dominated by Arab countries. The US depends on the Middle East for a quarter of its oil supplies. He said that the European Union is much more dependent on Arab oil and therefore sees the Middle East through the prism of energy security much more than the US does.
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i think i botched this one. Still working on it. Looks like i trusted someone when i should have looked on my own.
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I showed the illiterate blogger what you said, and he said you must be from West Virginia.
:shrug:
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yeh kosar will not allow you to say hearsay especially if its from some illiterates.
How China might invade Taiwan
Naval War College Review, Autumn, 2001 by Piers M. Wood, Charles D. FergusonE-mail Print Link While defense analysts agree that the Taiwan Strait remains a flashpoint for armed conflict because of China's near obsession with reunification with Taiwan, these analysts generally fall into two camps regarding China's ability to carry out a successful invasion against Taiwan, either today or in the foreseeable future.
One camp enumerates disproportionate numerical advantages in combat aircraft, soldiers, submarines, etc., that the People's Republic of China enjoys over Taiwan and also cites China's acquisition of advanced Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers, SS-N-22 Sunburn antiship cruise missiles, and Sukhoi-27 combat aircraft. While stopping short of predicting an easy victory over Taiwan, these analysts typically conclude that the United States must increase its military ties with Taiwan. (1) Other analysts envision a marked decrease in Taiwan's military capabilities in mid-decade that could give China an edge by the end of the decade. Some point out, however, that even massive U.S. arms shipments to Taiwan would do little in the short term to enhance the island's defenses, because of the time it would take Taiwan's military to absorb the new equipment. (2)
The other camp, in contrast, recognizes Taiwan's qualitative advantage in combat aircraft and warships. Moreover, this group perceives the difficulties inherent in an invasion of Taiwan and grasps the natural advantages possessed by defending forces. (3) Although these analysts acknowledge that Chinese modernization could someday prove decisive in a future invasion attempt, they usually place this development ten or twenty years hence.
The first school of thought is flawed by its reliance on more or less sophisticated "bean counts" that stop short of a full operational analysis. The second camp, for its part, is playing by Western rules and perhaps forgets that twice in the last fifty years the United States has underestimated the determination of Asian militaries, with severe consequences. Further, both groups generally presume that an invasion would be an all-or-nothing proposition, positing that an invasion must occur in one fell swoop (the "nothing" possibility including an "escalating ladder" of threats meant to intimidate Taiwan into capitulation without an invasion). By and large, they neglect, or do not probe in detail, a third contingency--a phased military operation. Faced with operational realities, military professionals most often think in terms of extended campaigns. However, in this case the staging aspect has been so seldom addressed recently that few modern readers are even aware that the Peng Hu Islands (formerly the Pesca dores) sit astride the invasion routes across the Taiwan Strait--as hard to ignore, tactically, as an ox in the living room.
As a contribution to the debate over whether or not China possesses the capability to invade Taiwan in the near term, this article assesses this missing factor from a doctrinal perspective and finds that a phased invasion, one that ratchets up the level of offensive operations, has a better prospect of success than an all-out attack against the main island of Taiwan. While we make no predictions about the success or failure of a Chinese invasion against Taiwan in the foreseeable future, we caution that a determined China could launch an invasion sooner than the five, ten, or twenty years that some have projected, though it would be unlikely to succeed if it made the attempt today.
PHASED INVASION
The People's Liberation Army could realize a number of important advantages, should it invade Taiwan, by conducting the operation in three phases: seizing Quemoy (Kinmen) and other islands close to the mainland, capturing the Peng Hu Islands, and assaulting Taiwan's west coast. By attacking these objectives in succession, the Chinese could amass great numerical superiority against each one in turn and render the next object less defensible. This stepping-stone strategy would place the defenders in the predicament of deciding whether to absorb casualties fighting for key terrain currently under attack or to conserve resources for a final stand on the main island.
Phasing could work to the Chinese advantage for other reasons as well. Beijing could exploit the initial phase domestically, creating a state of war fever that would generate support for military construction projects that would in turn be essential for succeeding phases but would seem unjustifiable in peacetime. Moreover, a break after the first two phases would allow an opportunity for major upgrades in military training, taking advantage of experience gained in what would amount to combat "rehearsals" for an assault against the main island. Long halts would keep the door open for a general surrender or a favorable negotiated settlement with Taiwan. Notably, the preliminary phases might also be viewed as less than a full attack on the island, and thus as not justifying U.S. military intervention.
For the People's Liberation Army, an attack on Quemoy represents more an opportunity than a risk. Although Quemoy is heavily fortified with tunnel and bunker complexes, the Chinese would have little difficulty amassing five-to-one odds against Quemoy's fifty-five thousand defenders. Also, because of its proximity to the mainland and the shallow depth of the water between, an attack on Quemoy would resemble less an amphibious invasion than a river crossing. Accordingly, the Chinese could safely presuppose one of the cardinal precepts of amphibious doctrine, air superiority. That is, they could conduct the attack under the umbrella of air defense forces--both on the mainland (long-range surface-to-air missiles belonging to the People's Liberation Army Air Force) and missile and antiaircraft-artillery forces integral to the army assault units themselves. Keeping the Chinese air force largely out of this battle would preserve its aircraft, while air defense forces could shoot down some of the Taiwanese air force' s best aircraft--unless the Taiwanese held them back. Chinese antiair artillery would have two factors in its favor: huge numbers and concentration of firepower. The Chinese could employ about sixteen thousand air-defense artillery tubes, compared to the four thousand guns that Iraq had in the Persian Gulf War. Also, and again in contrast to DESERT STORM, this battle would take place in a confined space--fifty miles of coastline and inland perhaps thirty-five miles.
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I found a poll that said 60% of USA does not think this will happen before Jan 4 2009 and
40% did.
Why are they polling this question if it is not a distinct possiblity ?
Naval War College Review, Autumn, 2001 by Piers M. Wood, Charles D. FergusonE-mail Print Link While defense analysts agree that the Taiwan Strait remains a flashpoint for armed conflict because of China's near obsession with reunification with Taiwan, these analysts generally fall into two camps regarding China's ability to carry out a successful invasion against Taiwan, either today or in the foreseeable future.
One camp enumerates disproportionate numerical advantages in combat aircraft, soldiers, submarines, etc., that the People's Republic of China enjoys over Taiwan and also cites China's acquisition of advanced Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers, SS-N-22 Sunburn antiship cruise missiles, and Sukhoi-27 combat aircraft. While stopping short of predicting an easy victory over Taiwan, these analysts typically conclude that the United States must increase its military ties with Taiwan. (1) Other analysts envision a marked decrease in Taiwan's military capabilities in mid-decade that could give China an edge by the end of the decade. Some point out, however, that even massive U.S. arms shipments to Taiwan would do little in the short term to enhance the island's defenses, because of the time it would take Taiwan's military to absorb the new equipment. (2)
The other camp, in contrast, recognizes Taiwan's qualitative advantage in combat aircraft and warships. Moreover, this group perceives the difficulties inherent in an invasion of Taiwan and grasps the natural advantages possessed by defending forces. (3) Although these analysts acknowledge that Chinese modernization could someday prove decisive in a future invasion attempt, they usually place this development ten or twenty years hence.
The first school of thought is flawed by its reliance on more or less sophisticated "bean counts" that stop short of a full operational analysis. The second camp, for its part, is playing by Western rules and perhaps forgets that twice in the last fifty years the United States has underestimated the determination of Asian militaries, with severe consequences. Further, both groups generally presume that an invasion would be an all-or-nothing proposition, positing that an invasion must occur in one fell swoop (the "nothing" possibility including an "escalating ladder" of threats meant to intimidate Taiwan into capitulation without an invasion). By and large, they neglect, or do not probe in detail, a third contingency--a phased military operation. Faced with operational realities, military professionals most often think in terms of extended campaigns. However, in this case the staging aspect has been so seldom addressed recently that few modern readers are even aware that the Peng Hu Islands (formerly the Pesca dores) sit astride the invasion routes across the Taiwan Strait--as hard to ignore, tactically, as an ox in the living room.
As a contribution to the debate over whether or not China possesses the capability to invade Taiwan in the near term, this article assesses this missing factor from a doctrinal perspective and finds that a phased invasion, one that ratchets up the level of offensive operations, has a better prospect of success than an all-out attack against the main island of Taiwan. While we make no predictions about the success or failure of a Chinese invasion against Taiwan in the foreseeable future, we caution that a determined China could launch an invasion sooner than the five, ten, or twenty years that some have projected, though it would be unlikely to succeed if it made the attempt today.
PHASED INVASION
The People's Liberation Army could realize a number of important advantages, should it invade Taiwan, by conducting the operation in three phases: seizing Quemoy (Kinmen) and other islands close to the mainland, capturing the Peng Hu Islands, and assaulting Taiwan's west coast. By attacking these objectives in succession, the Chinese could amass great numerical superiority against each one in turn and render the next object less defensible. This stepping-stone strategy would place the defenders in the predicament of deciding whether to absorb casualties fighting for key terrain currently under attack or to conserve resources for a final stand on the main island.
Phasing could work to the Chinese advantage for other reasons as well. Beijing could exploit the initial phase domestically, creating a state of war fever that would generate support for military construction projects that would in turn be essential for succeeding phases but would seem unjustifiable in peacetime. Moreover, a break after the first two phases would allow an opportunity for major upgrades in military training, taking advantage of experience gained in what would amount to combat "rehearsals" for an assault against the main island. Long halts would keep the door open for a general surrender or a favorable negotiated settlement with Taiwan. Notably, the preliminary phases might also be viewed as less than a full attack on the island, and thus as not justifying U.S. military intervention.
For the People's Liberation Army, an attack on Quemoy represents more an opportunity than a risk. Although Quemoy is heavily fortified with tunnel and bunker complexes, the Chinese would have little difficulty amassing five-to-one odds against Quemoy's fifty-five thousand defenders. Also, because of its proximity to the mainland and the shallow depth of the water between, an attack on Quemoy would resemble less an amphibious invasion than a river crossing. Accordingly, the Chinese could safely presuppose one of the cardinal precepts of amphibious doctrine, air superiority. That is, they could conduct the attack under the umbrella of air defense forces--both on the mainland (long-range surface-to-air missiles belonging to the People's Liberation Army Air Force) and missile and antiaircraft-artillery forces integral to the army assault units themselves. Keeping the Chinese air force largely out of this battle would preserve its aircraft, while air defense forces could shoot down some of the Taiwanese air force' s best aircraft--unless the Taiwanese held them back. Chinese antiair artillery would have two factors in its favor: huge numbers and concentration of firepower. The Chinese could employ about sixteen thousand air-defense artillery tubes, compared to the four thousand guns that Iraq had in the Persian Gulf War. Also, and again in contrast to DESERT STORM, this battle would take place in a confined space--fifty miles of coastline and inland perhaps thirty-five miles.
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I found a poll that said 60% of USA does not think this will happen before Jan 4 2009 and
40% did.
Why are they polling this question if it is not a distinct possiblity ?
Hmmm.. I'd be happy to hear his views over here.
I'd be happy to talk about this with him.
His premises are all wrong and quite simply, ignorant.
You're talking about 'opposing views', when in fact I agree with his general opinion, as I stated above, that China will not attack Taiwan.
His reasons for this are goofy and I wouldn't even know where to start.
Is this even a topic, though?
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I'm aware, and have been for a long time, that we have a treaty with Taiwan that, I guess, 'requires' us to defend Taiwan if China invades.
Again, has this even become an issue lately? Or perhaps i'm the twilight zone.
On your investments Scotty--sure would think twice about sinking big bunch in gold when its at alltime high--little late for that move IMO--can't see a lot of upside but lots of down side.
Setting about 60% in interest bearing securities myself picking up a few what "I think" to be some oversold stocks and will do so up till cash @ 50%.
Politics aside--will wait till Nov--if the greenies get in will will take 1/2 of cash fund and shore up China stocks--like India also but too volitile with Pakistan relations and bombings.
Both will have huge adv in productions cost over those in greenie treaty. Not saying its right--just a fact.
Setting about 60% in interest bearing securities myself picking up a few what "I think" to be some oversold stocks and will do so up till cash @ 50%.
Politics aside--will wait till Nov--if the greenies get in will will take 1/2 of cash fund and shore up China stocks--like India also but too volitile with Pakistan relations and bombings.
Both will have huge adv in productions cost over those in greenie treaty. Not saying its right--just a fact.
I'll tell you what.
If you get that blogger over here, I will discuss with him much more in detail how goofy his 'points' are.
I'm not going to take the time to do it with you, because all you're doing is scrambling around on google looking for stuff. Not sure you really even read much of it.
That's fine.
Just as a start, though, China could take Taiwan in about 2 days.
Reconcile that with your new friends post.
(sigh)- Scotty how did you all of a sudden become worried about the China/Taiwan relationship?
If you really have an interest in it, let me know. We can talk about it.
I think you got some nonsense from some blog and now you're 'worried' about this issue, going as far to say that if the Chinese get 'embarrassed' (whatever that means) at the Olympics, then they will invade Taiwan.
I mean, wtf?
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Listen kosar. I read everything I post before I post it. I resent having you lump me in with
gardenweasl, DTB, RAYMOND, Sponge and a few others just with a wave of your wand.
Its a insult to me personally and I would not expect a friend to say that to me.
You and me goin round and round.
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Dammit
KOSAR - read the thread.
The first post explains it why I am worried about it.
DOOGY DUH !
Sorry, man.
Have your blogger friend come around and we can all discuss it. :SIB
