continuing discussion about airline security in the wake of the attempted detonation of a Christmas Day flight, the question has been raised of whether El Al, the Israeli airline, might offer a security model for this country has been raised in many quarters, from media, to the blogosphere, by readers and writers. What's it like? Former Time magazine reporter Lisa Beyer wrote on that subject back in 2006. They don't make you take off shoes:
Flying out of Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion airport recently, after covering the outbreak of violence between Israel and Hizballah, I got the usual treatment for a gentile foreigner: half an hour of questioning by a young security agent before I even got to the counter. He started with "when were you born?" and ended with "how did you get to the airport?" and covered a lot of ground in between. I was accustomed to the drill, having lived in Israel throughout the 1990s as TIME's Jerusalem bureau chief. This, chiefly, is how the Israelis keep aviation safe in their country; no flight out of Tel Aviv has ever been hijacked. They ask a lot of questions, don't hesitate to take their time doing it, aren't embarrassed about profiling fliers and are quick to take matters to a higher level of scrutiny.
The point of the long question sessions is to find inconsistencies in a terrorist's cover story, or to agitate him into a panic. I was typically asked questions like: who paid for your ticket, why are you traveling, why did you buy the ticket so late (or so early), where did you travel in Israel, whom did you meet here. Answers like "the Prime Minister" never seemed to get me anywhere. Almost always, I'd be questioned by one agent, who would then leave to consult with a second agent, who would appear and ask many of the same questions. Then the two would compare notes, often with a supervisor, before the first agent would return with more questions. Women traveling alone are said to get special attention because of the case of an unwitting Irish woman who in 1986 was wooed by a Jordanian terrorist who gave her a suitcase with a bomb sewn into it; El Al agents at Heathrow discovered it by questioning her.
Once, on my way to Tel Aviv from London, I was drilled especially nastily by an Israeli agent. Years later, my upstairs neighbor came down to say he wanted to bring over his new live-in girlfriend but she was reluctant. It turned out she was that agent and remembered me. When she finally did visit, we laughed about it, though of course I had to ask if the contents of her bag belonged to her.
Sometimes, questions don't suffice. In the mid 90s, my brother and his wife came to visit me in Israel, and something about these two blond Louisiana lawyers struck the security officials at Ben Gurion as suspicious. After the usual bout of questions, they were led away to a special room where every ounce of toothpaste, lotion, shampoo and Neosporin in their luggage was squeezed out of its packaging and examined. They missed their original flight and, once deemed harmless, were eventually put on a later one, but only after officials seized my brother's scuba diving gear. I was able to get it released later.
Traveling in and out of Israel for Arabs and for Muslims from all over the world, that kind of treatment is not uncommon. Neither are strip searches. Profiling in Israel is not a dirty word.
I was the subject of a much milder form of it, every time I flew out of Ben Gurion. Security officials, plainly, are charged with determining whether fliers are Jewish are not. My name could go either way. The Israelis know it's rude by Western standards to come right out and ask, so they have a set of questions meant to settle the matter: Do you have family here in Israel? Did you ever volunteer on a kibbutz? Do you speak Hebrew? Some prayers maybe? That you learned for your baht mitzvah? What are your children's names? And this last time I flew: Are you a member of a congregation at home? I've learned to recognize these questions for what they are and to simply tell the questioner I'm not Jewish so that he can protest that it's not what he was getting at and then move on to why I booked an aisle seat. Once, when I was running late, I said that my son was named Yaakov, the Hebrew version of his name, Jacob, and I found myself whisked through in no time.
On another occasion, though, I decided I wouldn't play the game. If the agent wouldn't come right out and ask me, I wasn't going to let him know whether I was Jewish or not. I answered every question truthfully but in a way that gave nothing away. Yes, I knew a little Hebrew, which I'd learned in Israel. Yes, I had family in the country: my husband, stepson and children. No, I had not volunteered on a kibbutz. And so on. When finally the time of my flight's departure passed, I leaned forward and said to the agent: "Listen, I'm not Jewish." "Well, nobody's perfect," he said, and put me on the next flight.
Would Americans put up with this kind of screening?
The cynical answer: Of course they would! All they need is an occasional jolt of "terror" and you'll be amaze at their compliance.
Israeli airport security is dramatically more time-consuming and invasive (for some) than anything in the U-S. According to the Wikipedia entry on El Al airport security:
Passengers are asked to report three hours before departure. All El Al terminals around the world are closely monitored for security. There are plain-clothes agents and fully armed police or military personnel who patrol the premises for explosives, suspicious behavior, and other threats. Inside the terminal, passengers and their baggage are checked by a trained team. El Al security procedures require that all passengers be interviewed individually prior to boarding, allowing El Al staff to identify possible security threats. Passengers will be asked questions about where they are coming from, the reason for their trip, their job or occupation, and whether they have packed their bags themselves. The likelihood of potential terrorists remaining calm under such questioning is believed to be low (see microexpression). At the check-in counter the passengers' passports and tickets are closely examined. A ticket without a sticker from the security checkers will not be accepted. At passport control passengers' names are checked against information from the FBI, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Scotland Yard, Shin Bet, and Interpol databases. Luggage is screened and sometimes hand searched. In addition, bags are put through a decompression chamber simulating pressures during flight that could trigger explosives.
It's true that passengers don't have to take their shoes off, which a lot of passengers on U-S flights appear to find annoying. But that's because government security "profilers" ask extensive questions of each individual passenger until they are satisfied that a passenger does not pose a threat ? making the removal of shoes quite beside the point:
They probe, as one profiling supervisor told
for "anything out of the ordinary, anything that does not fit." Their questions can seem odd or intrusive. . . . Only when the profiler is satisfied that a passenger poses no risk is he or she allowed to proceed to the check-in counter. By that point, there is no need to make him remove his shoes, or to confiscate his bottle of water.
Many passengers in this country might say they'd be fine with these practices. Some travelers complain that the Israeli practices are unacceptable, much too invasive, add too much delay, and are unnecessary. It's also interesting to note that the Israelis have increased airport security in response to the Christmas attack for all flights to the United States.
Asking whether Americans would put up with such screening measures may be framing the question too simply. Will we spend the money needed for the additional personnel? Will the already dysfunctional, unprofitable airlines survive the moves necessary to secure the security? Would Americans be willing to pay for the added security through increased fees? Would you be willing to pay an extra, say, $70 per flight to lower your chances of ending up on a plane targeted for terror when the odds of that happening to you are more 10 million to one?
It's a bit illusory to say that Israel does this or that, so the U-S should consider it, as though it was a wash. I've yet to hear advocates of this idea address scale. Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv only has about 11.5 million passengers per year --putting it just behind Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International with 13.6 million.
Over 800 million people flew in the United States in 2008, 43 million of them out of Hartsfield in Atlanta. Adopting such Israeli security screening at Hartsfield, O'Hare in Chicago (31 million passengers) or Dallas (26 million) would shut the system down.
Far fewer people enter Israel than enter America; furthermore, the people that DO enter Israel do so for a much more limited number of reasons than those entering America. Either you're going for religious reasons (in which case they ask questions to ascertain that you are, in fact, as religious as you claim), or you're on business (in which case there are a limited number of places you might go), or both. Since America is so much bigger, and the reasons for entering it are so numerous, it just seems to me like it would be much easier to fake a reason for entering America than for entering Israel, and to maintain that fiction in the face of a security agent.
So while there may be some lessons we can learn and techniques we can use from El Al, it's absurd to speak as though all we have to do is get a few Israeli consultants and retool the system overnight.